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Judicial

Review: Its Influence Abroad
By DONALD

P. KOMMERS

ABSTRACT: The doctrine of judicial review, having been
nourished in a legal culture and socio-political environment
favorable to its growth, is America’s most distinctive contribution to constitutional government. Judicial review as
historically practiced in the United States was duly recorded
abroad, with varying degrees of influence and acceptability.
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
influence of judicial review was most conspicuous in Latin
America, where it was adopted as an articulate principle of
numerous national constitutions, while most European nations consciously rejected it as incompatible with the prevailing theory of separation of powers. Germany, Austria, and
Switzerland, although marginally influenced by the American
experience, developed, as did several commonwealth nations,
their own variants of judicial review. Since World War II,
judicial review has emerged as a governing principle, partly
in response to the excesses of prewar popular democracies,
in the constitutions of many countries, including those of
emergent nations of Asia and Africa. But in nearly all of
these new nations, including Latin American nations, judicial review has not developed into an effective instrument
of limited government. On the other hand, it has worked well
in Japan, West Germany, and Italy, whose postwar constitutions were strongly influenced by the United States. Recent
experience shows that judicial review works best in advanced,
middle-class societies firmly committed to the idea of limited
government.

Donald P. Kommers is Professor of Government and International Studies and
Adjunct Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame. He is also Director
of Notre Dame’s Center for Civil Rights. His M.A. and Ph.D. degrees are from
the University of Wisconsin. He was recently an Alexander von Humboldt Fellow
in the Law School of the University of Cologne, West Germany. His work on
German politics and comparative constitutional law has been published both
in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. His most recent book
is Judicial Politics in West Germany: A Study of the Federal Constitutional Court.
I wish to thank Mr. Michael J. Wahoske, a Kiley Fellow at the
Dame Law School, for his assistance in the preparation of this article.
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ALEXIS

de Tocqueville, in De-

system of government. It is worth

mocracy in America, observed noting
that there was something very special about the exercise of judicial
power in the United States. The
special characteristic, still present even as the French observer
correctly reported it, is &dquo;the right
of the judges to found their decisions on the constitution rather
than on the laws,&dquo;1 which means
that judges are at liberty to refuse
to enforce laws held by them to be
in violation of the Constitution. This
doctrine of judicial review unquestionably is America’s most distinctive contribution to modern constitutionalism. Nearly 50 years after the
founding fathers assembled in Philadelphia &dquo;to form a more perfect
union,&dquo; Tocqueville wrote in his
classic treatise that &dquo;the representative system of government has been
adopted in several states of Europe,
but I am not aware that any nation
of the globe has hitherto organized
a judicial power on the priniciple
now adopted by the Americans.&dquo;2
In this our Bicentennial year, 150
years after Tocqueville wrote, we
might ourselves glance abroad to see
what influence, if any, the American
doctrine of judicial review has exerted on other peoples.

the outset that

judicial
explicit invention
of the Constitution. Rather, it was
formally proclaimed by the Judiciary

review

at

was

not

an

itself in the person of Chief Justice

John Marshall, whose celebrated
opinion in Marbury v. Madison
(1803) established judicial review

a mainspring of the American
constitutional order. Marshall’s
opinion, which had ample precedent
in the colonial experience, advanced
the proposition that the Constitution
is the &dquo;fundamental and paramount
law of the nation,&dquo; a law of superior
obligation binding upon all political
officials and all governing institutions and in terms of which all laws
and public acts are to be judged.
Marshall concluded, with a yawning
gap in his logic, that because judges
are bound by the Constitution, it is
within the particular competence of
the Judiciary to declare a law void
if in conflict with the Constitution.
But whatever the deficiencies of
Marshall’s logic in justifying the
ascription of such power to the Judicial branch, Americans have since
almost instinctively identified judicial supremacy in constitutional
matters with limited government
and the rule of law.
Yet the idea that governments and
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND AMERICAN political rulers must be subject to
GOVERNMENT
an order of higher law has ancient
roots.
The obligation of Athenian
Any assessment of the influence of
to apply statutes only as conjudges
the American doctrine of judicial
review abroad needs to be pre- sistent with higher law is probably
ceeded by some discussion of the the oldest historical antecedent of
ideas and forces which contributed judicial review. Medieval princes
to the growth and durability of judi- and kings were also subject to natcial review in the United States and ural and divine law, and this printo its significance in the American ciple remained prevalent throughout
the Middle Ages. For a brief time,
1. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in
of the French Parlements durjudges
America (London. Oxford University Press,
the Ancien Regime also claimed
ing
1952), p. 79.
a power to nullify laws and execu2. Ibid., p. 77.
as
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tive decrees that

were in violation
of the fundamental laws of the realm.
In England, Sir Edward Coke’s
opinions asserted the supremacy of
the Common Law and the Magna
Charta over parliamentary statutes,
and many colonial leaders who were
influenced by Coke-especially
by his Institutes-and opposed
to the exercise of the royal prerogative over their affairs formally approved of the doctrine of judicial
supremacy. But the principle that
judges should be the guardians of
the constitution prevailed only in
America. In England, Coke’s view
was totally rejected, and the principle of parliamentry supremacy was
fully affirmed in the aftermath
of the conflict between king and
Parliament. In France, the coming
of the French Revolution and the
accompanying doctrine of popular
sovereignty ended the judicial prac-

all lawmaking authority
within the state was vested in the
sovereign legislature, while the role
of the independent judiciary was to
interpret the legislature’s will and
to administer the law as written.
For a judge to set aside the law,
whatever the reason, was to the
powers,

European mind, schooled

in analyjurisprudence, the very definition of arbitrary government. Thus,
given such a tradition, the liberty

tical

and security of the individual in
much of Europe was identified
with equal administration of justice
under law, Europe’s principal contribution to the theory of constitutionalism. This notion of constitutional government did not imply
democratic political institutions,
however. Parliamentary democracy,
which also excluded judicial review,
was England’s contribution to constitutionalism ; to this heritage the
tice of voiding legislation. Indeed, United States added the concept of
it was the French doctrine of separa- judicial review.
tion of powers that prevailed in most
LIMITS ON PRIVATE AND
of Europe.
GOVERNMENTAL
POWER
Although judicial review as known
in the United States was rejected in
The American notion of free
Europe, a firm tradition of constitu- government provided very suitable
tional government existed in the soil for the growth of judicial review.
positivistic legal cultures of the con- The reasons for its success here may
tinental civil law tradition. This tra- possibly help to explain both its
dition, unlike the Anglo-American acceptance and its rejection in other
tradition, regarded the state- parts of the world. Moored to the
whose general will was personified political theories of Locke and Monby a national assembly-as the tesquieu, the founders firmly besource of all law, even of constitulieved in the respective doctrines of
tional law. It also insisted that law natural rights and balanced governbe founded on human reason and ment. Balanced government to them
promulgated for the commonweal. was synonomous with limited
Rationality and generality were thus government. To avoid the concentraindispensable properties of a govern- tion of political power in any one
ment ruled by law. Generality person or institution, they housed
ensured that citizens would be the familiar triad of government
treated equally under the law, while powers-executive, legislative, and
rationality required that the law judicial-in separate structures
itself be reasonable. Under the buttressed by a system of checks and
European variant of separation of balances. At the same time, they
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believed that government existed to before a court of justice
by the choice
protect the natural rights of men and of parties, or by the necessity of the
to establish a political order de- case.&dquo;3 He also noted that laws
which
signed to help men pursue their judges refuse to apply, owing to their
personal happiness. The fulfillment constitutional invalidity, tend to lose
of private ambition and aspiration, their &dquo;moral
cogency,&dquo; which he
endorsed and assisted by a solicitous wisely discerned to be the real
signifgovernment, came close to a good icance of judicial review in America.
American definition of the public
interest in the eighteenth and early
THREE PERIODS OF INFLUENCE
nineteenth centuries.
Yet the founders

power

and

as

regarded all State and federal authority:
potentially corruptible, 1870s

1789-

they wondered how to limit priThe story of judicial review’s
as well as governmental power.
Madison provided one answer, indi- influence abroad is partly intercating that private power could be woven with the distinct roles played
brought under control within a con- by the United States Supreme Court
stitutional order which fostered the in various historical eras. (Like all
diversity and multiplication of fac- historical epochs, these eras nattions. If enough factions occupied urally overlap, but for our purposes
the political space of the new Ameri- a liberal division of Supreme Court
can Republic, he argued, the
power history is appropriate.) During each
of each faction would be checked by of these eras, judicial review as
the countervailing power of compet- practiced in America was duly reing factions, allowing not one of corded abroad, with varying degrees
them to gain a monopoly of power. of influence and acceptability. In the
At the same time, the power of gov- first period, from 1789 to the midernment generally would be held at 1870s, the Supreme Court was prebay by the proliferation and cumula- occupied with defining the boundvate

tive influence of private institutions
and groups. Thus, in Madison’s

thought-which became

our

con-

ventional wisdom-freedom ultimately was to be based upon the
interplay and countervailing thrusts
of private and public power.
Judicial review worked supremely
well within a legal order characterized by an obsession with individual
liberty, an economic order based on
private property, and a constitutional order of separated powers.
Tocqueville saw this clearly. &dquo;Few
laws can escape the searching analysis of the judicial power for any
length of time,&dquo; he wrote, &dquo;for there

ary

between state and federal

au-

thority and buttressing its own
authority as well in the American
political order. It was this history

that was most familiar to constitution-makers in Latin America and
continental Europe when they began to erect representative republics
and draft written constitutions in the
nineteenth century.
During this period, the American
influence was most notable in Latin
America. Although rooted in the
civil law tradition, various Latin
American countries, copying from
the colossus of the north, entrusted
the power of judicial review to their
courts on a broad scale. The Argenare few which are not prejudiced to
tine constitution of 1860 and the
some private interest or other, and
none which may not be
brought 3. Ibid., p. 81.
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Brazilian constitution of 1891 contained provisions on judicial review
consciously copied from the American experience. These constitutions,
like the Canadian constitution of
1867 (British North American Act) and
the Australian constitution of 1900,

established judicial review as a
necessary concomitant of federalism.
Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v.

Maryland (1819) constituted a significant point of departure for the

provided for a high court of constitutional review modeled after the
American Supreme Court. &dquo;Constitutional review,&dquo; however, had a
different meaning in Europe than
did &dquo;judicial review&dquo; in America.
&dquo;Constitutional review&dquo; was a
power exercised by a specialized
constitutional court to decide constitutional controversies only between organs and levels of government. But these specialized courts,
which also existed under several

consideration of federal-state relations by the judiciary in each of these mid-nineteenth-century German
nations. Mexico, which has also had state constitutions, were not attributa system of government with strong
able to any American influence;
federal characteristics, has had a rather, they had their institutional
more limited variant of judicial
antecedent in the fifteenth-century
review. Nevertheless, Tocqueville court of the Imperial Chamber, behimself has been credited with in- fore which warring princes took
fluencing the adoption of judicial their disputes. Uniquely European,
review by Mexico’s constitution of these institutions nevertheless con1857. As one legal scholar reports, stituted convenient vehicles for the
&dquo;the immediate source of amparo reception of judicial review more re[a proceeding initiated by an indi- lated to the American pattern. Switvidual citizen to challenge an arbi- zerland was the real pioneer of
trary governmental act] must be European judicial review. Under the
found in the American institution of 1848 Swiss bill of rights, a citizen
judicial review transmitted to the could challenge a cantonal (state)
Mexicans through Tocqueville’s law allegedly in violation of a fundaDemocracy in America.&dquo;4 Finally, mental right in the federal parliaCosta Rica adopted the American ment. Parliament, if it saw fit,
plan of judicial review in 1871.
might then place the case before the
federal court. Still, the legal order
to
we
find
Shifting briefly Europe,
that judicial review was well known predominant in Europe in the 1800s
to many German legal scholars in the was generally incompatible with juearly nineteenth century through dicial review, and even in those
the classic work on American con- countries where traces of American
stitutionalism by Robert von Mohl.55 influence were visible, the prinVon Mohl, a member of the Frank- ciples of popular sovereignty and
furt Parliament, had a hand in draft- the European variant of separation
ing the constitution of 1848, which of powers remained wholly uncom4. Richard D. Baker, Judicial Review in
Mexico (Austin: The University of Texas
Press, 1971), p. 33.
5. For a discussion ofvon Mohl’s influence,

promised by judicial

review.

Rights of

and property:

contract

1870s -1937
In the second

Gottfried Dietze, "Robert von Mohl,
period of judicial
Germany’s de Tocqueville," in Dietze, ed.,
Essays on the American Constitution (Engle- review, covering the late postbellum
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), period era down to 1937, the Supp. 184-212.
preme Court used its authority in
see
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struck down. Their legal orders were
simply not congenial to the principle
of judicial supremacy in constitutional matters. The Polish constitution of 1921 actually banned the
courts from reviewing legislation on
constitutional grounds.~7
In continental Europe, the American influence was most perceptible
in Germany, where judicial review
was debated in the Weimar National
Assembly. The &dquo;founding fathers&dquo;
seemed about evenly split on judicial review, for it missed being
own newly written constitutions.
expressly put into the 1919 constiAustria, Germany, and Czecho- tution by a single committee vote.
slovakia, following the European But the founders did not expressly
tradition of constitutional review, forbid judicial review either, failing
established specialized constitu- to heed the warning of Hugo Preusstional tribunals independent of the Germany’s leading authority on conregular judiciary and vested with stitutional law-that the courts
jurisdiction limited to appeals by would exercise judicial review if the
national or state governments and, constitution did not expressly forbid
in the case of Czechoslovakia, to the it. While some spokesmen argued
Supreme Court of Justice. Often that judicial review was incompatreferred to as &dquo;political courts,&dquo; they ible with the principle of separation
were designed largely as forums in
of powers, other more socially conwhich to settle constitutional dis- scious delegates were undoubtedly
putes between levels and units of aware of the conservative uses of
government. Individual citizens judicial review in the United States.
were not permitted to file petitions
They may also have been mindful
in these tribunals. Hans Kelsen, the of an 1875 decision by the Hanseatic
father of the Austrian constitution of Court of Appeals which invalidated
1920, although acknowledging his a local tax law as violative of the right
debt to American constitutional to property under the Bremen conpractice in prescribing the consti- stitution. (The first recorded intutional court, was convinced of the stance of judicial review in Gersuperiority of a system which com- many, the decision was quickly
pletely separated constitutional overruled by the Imperial Court
from ordinary adjudication.~On the which rejected the authority of
other hand, the regular judicial judges to review the constitutionestablishments of Denmark, Norway, ality of laws.)8
and Rumania claimed to have the
7. A survey of judicial review in all of the
to review
measure to protect the rights
of contract and property against
invasion by both state and federal
governments. Mirroring the entreprenurial spirit of a &dquo;gilded age,&dquo;
and infused ideologically by social
Darwinism and the Gospel of
Wealth, the Supreme Court wove a
garland of constitutional principles
that crowned American capitalism.
This history was most familiar to
European nations before and after
World War I as they sought to anchor
representative government in their

large

authority
legislation,
mainly to protect property rights,
but very few laws actually were
6. See Hans Kelsen,

Legislation:

A

"Judicial Review of
Comparative Study of the

Austrian and the American Constitutions,"
Journal of Politics, vol. 4 (1942), pp. 183-200.

discussed above may be found in
Charles Grove Haines, The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy (New York:
Russell G. Russell, Inc., 1959), pp. 573-662.
8. See Donald P. Kommers, Judicial Politics in West Germany. A Study of the Federal
Constitutional Court (Beverly Hills, Cal..
countries

Sage Publications, Inc., 1976),

p. 36
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Preuss’s prediction came true as duras, 1894; Cuba, 1901; Nicaragua,
several German high courts claimed 1911; Haiti, 1918; Uruguay, 1919;
the power of judicial review even Chile, 1925; and Venezuela, 1928)
over national laws. Indeed, the High
adopted various aspects of American
Court of Justice voided two national judicial review. Most constitutional
laws in the 1920s, one on the ground provisions favoring judicial review
that the constitutional right to prop- were adopted in unthinking imitaerty had been violated, which gener- tion of the American model, for judiated another full-dress debate on cial review simply was not suited
judicial review by German legal to regimes marked by political instascholars. Still, Walter C. Simon, bility and constitutional discontipresident of the High Court during nuities. Only in the then relatively
this time (1922-29), was disap- durable constitutional orders of
pointed in his effort firmly to estab- Chile, Brazil, and Colombia did
lish judicial review. Clearly influ- judicial review become an operative
enced by the American experience, principle.
The origin of judicial review in
he noted: &dquo;During the seven years
of my office, I have tried to heighten Canada, Australia, Ireland, and other
the position of the Reichsgericht countries with present or past links
unceasingly but unsuccessfully. I to the British Commonwealth is not
wanted it to be like the Supreme so clearly the product of American
Court of the United States, a high influence. Their high courts are the
organ of the Commonwealth equal lineal successors of the old Privy
in rank to the Cabinet, having imme- Council. As McWhinney remarks,
diate intercourse with the President &dquo;In its historical origins, judicial
Until now, review of the Constitution in the
of the Republic
the Reichsgericht has not found a Commonwealth Countries was
Chief Justice Marshall.&dquo; But Simon simply part of the apparatus of
betrayed a revealing distrust of the Empire-a projection of Imperial
political process when he remarked power in legal institutional form.&dquo;lo
Here also judicial review developed
further:
on a far more restricted scale than
... in my opinion a republican comin the United States. McWhinney’s
monwealth will never find a check on the
overbearing power of parliamentari- summary indicates the multiple
anism and the secret influence of min- influences that account for judicial
isterial bureaucracy if the Supreme review in these countries:
....

Court is not perfectly independent
and on the same footing with both the
other powers of the state.9

Judicial review of the constitution in the
Commonwealth Countries today is an
organic growth stemming in part from
In the late nineteenth and early the accidents of past imperial associa-

twentieth centuries,

judicial

review

tions ; in part from conscious reception,

continued its growth, at least in in more recent times, of American legal
terms of its acceptability as a prin- ideas; and in part from the pragmatic,
trial and error, case-by-case, experiential
ciple. At least 10 additional Latin
inherent in the Common

development
(Bolivia, 1880; Law and Common
Brazil, 1891; Colombia, 1886; Hon- systems.’1

American nations

9. Walter C. Simon, "Relation of the GerJudiciary to the Executive and Legislative Branches," American Bar Association
Journal, vol. 15 (1929), p. 762.
man

Law-derived legal

10. Herman Mosler, ed., Constitutional
Review in the World Today (Berlin: Carl
Heymanns Verlag KG, 1962), p. 77.
11. Ibid., p. 87.
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Civil rights: 1937-present
In the third period of judicial
review, from 1937 down to the present time, the Supreme Court has
been heavily concerned with protecting the rights of defendants and
those rights of conscience specified
in the First Amendment and incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of &dquo;liberty.&dquo; The
right to property has still been
clearly within the ambience of the

The [Supreme] Court exists in its
present form mainly because of the
American victory in World War II and
subsequent allied Occupation of Japan.
On the surface, the legal reforms of the

Supreme Court’s protective powers,
although the Court has applied
harsher standards of review toward

in

legislation impinging

upon

First

Amendment freedoms than toward
legislation affecting property rights.
This history, along with the total
experience of judicial review in the
American system of government, has
been most influential in the establishment of judicial review in many
countries of the world in the postWorld War II era.

Judicial

review

spread quickly

around the world in the first two
decades following the war. But the
American influence was most manifest in the immediate postwar years
when India and the defeated nations
of the Second World War adopted
judicial review as a key feature of
their constitutional orders. India,
having just gained her independence, established a Supreme Court
with powers even greater than that
of the U.S. Supreme Court. A reading
of the debates of the Constituent
Assembly, which drafted the constitution of 1950, leaves no doubt of
India’s debt to constitutional practice
in the United States, just as American constitutional jurisprudence is
heavily reflected in the subsequent
growth of Indian constitutional law.
In Japan, the American influence
was absolutely decisive. One authority on the Japanese legal order
writes:

Occupation

were monumental-especially the establishment of a democratic

constitution and the creation of

an

independent Supreme Court to interpret
the constitution and protect human
rights through the exercise of judicial
review. 12

less direct
and
Austria, Germany,
Italy, but
still the exercise of judicial review
was cited and debated in their
respective constitutional conventions. The Europeans, of course,
were themselves
determined to
engineer new regimes of liberty
and to mend the cracks in their post1918 constitutions which had permitted popular majorities to get out
of hand and through which dictators
had thrust their ugly heads. Judicial
review was available as a means for
limiting popular government and for
protecting basic rights; but Austria
and Italy, in establishing a judicial
review mechanism, followed the
civil law pattern of creating a special
constitutional tribunal outside of the
regular judicial establishment.
Austria reestablished its prewar
Constitutional Court and Italy
created a new Constitutional Court
imitative of the Austrian model.
The German Federal Constitutional Court deserves more detailed
comment if only because of the
major role it has played in the political system of the Federal Republic.
Created by the Bonn Basic Law of
American influence

was

1949, it owes its existence only
indirectly to the Occupation Powers.
True, when the military governors
commissioned the Germans

to

draft

12. Glendon Schubert and David J. Danel-

ski, eds., Comparative Judicial Behavior
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1969),
p. 122.
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a new constitution, they made clear
that the constitution &dquo;should provide for an independent judiciary to
review federal legislation, to review
the exercise of federal executive
power, and ... to protect the civil
rights and freedoms of the individual.&dquo;13 But there is no evidence to
suggest that judicial review was
forced upon the Germans. Following their own tradition of constitutional review, they created the
Federal Constitutional Courtparalleled by a constitutional court
in each of the German states-to
hear constitutional controversies
only, mainly between branches and
levels of government. In this respect, the Constitutional Court was
to serve as the successor to the
Weimar Republic’s High State Court
(Staatsgerichtshof), not to be confused with the Supreme Court
(Reichsgericht), which stood at the
apex of the regular judicial system.
While the judges of all the regular
German courts were barred from declaring laws void on constitutional
grounds, they were authorized by
the Basic Law to certify constitutional questions arising in the
normal course of litigation to the
Federal Constitutional Court for
decision. Conferring upon the individual citizen the right to file a
constitutional complaint before the
court was unprecedented in Germany, and indeed was only statutorily based until 1971, when the
citizen’s right to complain directly
to the Constitutional Court was
rooted in the Basic Law itself. Eventually, the court came to play a role
far more significant in the protection of individual rights than as an
arbiter of federal-state relations, a

13. Germany 1947-1949: The Story in
Documents (U.S. Department of State Publication

3556, 1950), p. 278.

phenomenon that has also occurred
in the United States. 14

The German court’s authority
actually exceeded that of the United
States Supreme Court, for the Constitutional Court was authorized to
rule, within the framework of what
is called an abstract judicial review,
on the validity of federal and state
laws merely upon the request of the
federal or a state government or
upon the petition of 100 members
of the lower house of the federal
Parliament. The court was also
empowered to determine, at the
request of the federal government,
the constitutionality of political
parties. (So far, the court has declared two parties unconstitutional,
namely a neo-Nazi party in 1952 and
the Communist party in 1957. Both
were found to be undemocratic in
structure and antagonistic to the
principles of democracy.)
The adoption of judicial review
in Europe was not regarded with
universal favor, however. Some

observers, fearing judicial intrusion
into politics, had trouble reconciling
judicial review with parliamentary
democracy. Others argued that judicial review simply would not work
in Europe’s legal environment, a
reservation that seemingly would
apply to Japan with even greater
force. Was it really possible for
constitution-makers other than
those with sugar plums dancing in
their heads to believe that judicial
review could be made to work automatically by constitutional fiat?

Would judicial review survive in a
political culture where the judiciary
historically has been subordinated
to legislative and executive authority ? Karl Loewenstein, writing in
1951, frankly doubted that judicial
14. See Kommers,
215-32.

Judicial Politics,

pp.
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&dquo;integrate itself into tive supremacy.&dquo;16 Only the presi[European] political life as the dent of the republic, the prime
unique regulatory force it is in the minister, or the president of either
United States.&dquo;15
house of parliament may ask the
The Europeans themselves, and council to review a statute, before
particularly the Germans, were well its promulgation, on the ground of
aware of the abuses of judicial power
constitutionality.
In the last two decades, judicial
that could occur in a constitutional
order based on judicial review. That review has spread to other parts of
was one reason for the concentration
the world. A 1970 study revealed
of constitutional litigation in sepa- that the national constitutions of
rate courts. They were particularly nearly 60 nations provided for some
fearful of the American system of measure of judicial review. Most of
judicial selection, and consciously these constitutions were authored
refused to bestow life-time tenure by the emergent nations of Asia,
on the justices. Thus, their justices
Africa, and some additional Latin
are nominated and chosen for single
American countries. 17 Their judicial
non-renewable terms of 12 years by review structures were based on
the two houses of parliament, not by either American or European pracreview would

the executive. This system of recruitment, along with compulsory retirement at the age of 68, constitutes a
strong check on the court and assures
that its political complexion will not
differ substantially from that of parliament or the nation. In Italy and
Austria, parliament also shares,
along with the executive and the
regular judiciary, in the recruitment
of constitutional court judges.
It is of some interest to note, finally,
that France had remained steadfast
in its

opposition

to

judicial

review

until quite recently. In a substantial
departure from the French tradition
of parliamentary supremacy, the
1958 constitution provided for a
constitutional council for the purpose of reviewing the constitutionality of laws by parliament. But the
council was deliberately designed
as &dquo;a watchdog on behalf of execu-

tice,

or

variations between the two.

Nations in which

Anglo-American
strong-for example,
Burma, Pakistan, South Korea, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, and the
Philippines-tended to confer
broad powers of judicial review on
their highest appellate courts of civil
and criminal jurisdiction. Countries
influences

were

under continental European influences-for example, Algeria,
Central African Republic, the
Congo, and Madagascar-tended
to establish specialized constitutional courts of limited review. In
other countries-for example, Dahomey, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal, and
Upper Volta-the highest appellate
courts were authorized to hand
down only advisory opinions on
constitutional questions.
16.

Jack Hayward, The One and Indivisible
Republic (New York: W. W. Norton
Company, Inc., 1973), p. 122.

French
&
15. Karl Loewenstein, "The Value of Constitutions in Our Revolutionary Age," in
Constitutions and Constitutional Trends
Since World War II, ed. Arnold J. Zurcher
(New York: New York University Press,1951),

p. 217.

17. Donald P. Kommers, Cross-National
Comparisons of Constitutional Courts:
Toward a Theory of Judicial Review, prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of
The American Political Science Association,
Los Angeles, Cal., 8-12 September 1970.
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JUDICIAL REVIEW ABROAD:
PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE
What larger meaning can be drawr ~
from this brief survey of judicia j
review around the globe? Initially
it needs to be remarked that the 1
spread of judicial review as a formal /
constitutional device says nothing ,
about its operation or effectiveness
Indeed, the judicial review powers
of many of the countries listed above
have never been invoked. This is
true of most African nations, nearly
all of whose constitutions were
written in the 1960s and many ol
whose regimes have since collapsed
or are under the control of a
single
party or governed by a military junta.
In Latin America, too, judicial
review as an operative principle of
constitutional government-for
example, in Chile, Argentina, and
Brazil-has been washed away by
the rising tide of military dictator’

,

.

.

ships.
Ordinarily,

we

have tended to

associate judicial review with Anglo-

American influences and, as this
essay has shown, these have been
substantial in the development of
judicial review in many parts of the
world, even in regimes where the
legal order and political tradition
were at variance with the
AngloAmerican experience. Contrary to
the early expectations of Loewenstein and other skeptics, judicial
review has worked, and rather effectively, in the &dquo;alien environments&dquo;
of Japan, Italy, Austria, and West
Germany. The acceptance of the
principle of judicial review in so
many other nations may possibly
have more to do with the idea of a
written constitution, as McIlwain
suggested, than with any particular
genius or influence of American
constitutionalism. 18
18. Charles McIlwain, Constitutionalism
and the Changing World (New York: The
Macmillian Company, 1939), p. 248.

Anglo-Americans often tend to
judicial review with con-

associate

stitutional governments characterized by federalism, separation of
powers, a bill of rights, and an
independent judiciary. The constitutions of the world do reveal the
presence

of judicial review as a con-

stitutional principle in the large
majority of the world’s 17 federal
systems of government. Yet it would
be stretching matters to say that

judicial

review is

dition of

a

functional

federalism,

con-

for judicial

review is found in numerous nonfederal systems. By the same token,
at least at the level of constitutional

principle, judicial review seems

not

be associated with any given
pattern of executive-legislative relations, although it is usually found in
regimes where the judiciary is
wholly independent of the executive
and legislative branches.
A close look at the nations in which
judicial review has developed into
a
vital regulatory device-for
to

example, Japan, Australia, West
Germany, Ireland, Canada, Italy,
India (until very recently), and several Latin American countries-suggests that certain political conditions
and legal values are as important as
constitutional structure in sustaining
a regime of judicial review. The
effective exercise of judicial review
in these countries

seems

to

be

asso-

ciated, with few exceptions, with the
following legal and political conditions : a political order marked by a
durable constitutional tradition; a
pluralistic society with autonomous
groups free to oppose the governa high degree of individual
liberty; an advanced economy,
usually based on private enterprise;
significant independence of executive, legislative, and judicial author-

ment ;

ity ; a political culture characterized
by moderation and a stable competitive party system; and a legal cul-
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ture that places a high value on the tion with the need for social policies
judicial role as an instrument of con- and programs sired by the legislastitutional change. These are gen- ture. In fact, the Indian Supreme
erally the characteristics of middle- Court was a causal factor in the
class societies whose governments recent crisis of democracy in that
are circumscribed by substantial
country. A major constitutional de-controls. The judicial system in such bate raged in Indian legal circles
societies, suggests M. J. C. Vile, &dquo;is over the question of Parliament’s

the expression of the determination
that certain values are
given priority at the expense of
expediency or speed in the performance of certain types of governmental tasks.&dquo;19 The most important
of these values are the high priority
placed on individual liberty, on the
one hand, and political compromise
between contending interests, on
the other-the kind of social context
that Madison associated with the
notion of limited government. These
liberal democratic values, so highly
regarded in Japan and in advanced

to insure

Western societies,

are

largely rejected

in the Third World where national

unity and the coordination rather
than the separation of powers is

vigorously stressed. Regarded as a
bourgeois luxury, judicial review is
likely to be increasingly rejected by
these societies in principle as well
as in practice. Judicial review also
lacks support in advanced societies
under Communist domination. Socialist constitutions, like that of the
German Democratic Republic,
which recognize no meaningful
distinction between social and individual interests and whose purpose
it is to install a political economy
under the tutelage of the working
class, cannot very well tolerate a
separation of powers of the traditional Western variety.
India constitutes a classic study of
a struggling democratic
society
which has sought to reconcile basic
freedoms and their judicial protec19. M. J. C. Vile, Constitutionalism and
the Separation of Powers (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1967), p. 339.

power to amend the fundamental
rights, particularly the right to property. In 1969, in a landmark case, the

Supreme Court invalidated by

a

of
Parliament nationalizing fourteen
major banks .20 The furor in Parliament generated by the decision
prompted the Court actually to reverse itself in the 1973 Fundamental
Rights case.21 There, the Court
emphasized the priority of &dquo;social
justice,&dquo; in terms of which, the justices noted, all &dquo;fundamental rights&dquo;
must be interpreted. One justice
even proceeded to undermine the
doctrine of judicial supremacy: &dquo;A
modern democratic constitution is,
to my mind, an expression of the
sovereign will of the people,
a legal sovereignty, which was previously vested in the British Parliament.&dquo;22 But the constitution was
also broadly interpreted to sustain
the right of Parliament to amend the
fundamental rights. The same jusnarrow

six to five

margin

an

act

...

tice wrote:
In the

background of the Indian Constitution, the fundamental rights were
intended to make all citizens and persons
appreciate that the paramount
law of the land has swept away privilege
and has laid down that there is to be
one section of
the community and another in the matter
of all those rights that are essential for
the material and moral perfection of
man.23

perfect equality between

20. Salak Nath

v.

State

of Punjab, 2 S. C. R.

762 (1967).
21. Kesavanda v. State of Kerala, 60 All
Indian Reporter 1461 (1973).
22. Ibid., p. 1969.
23. Ibid., pp. 1971-72.
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
a potential break on
governmental action in future cases.
Thus, when Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi (through the president) deremained

clared emergency rule in India in
scope of
judicial review was among the first
privileges of the constitution to be
sacrificed for the sake of &dquo;national
unity,&dquo; along with the basic freedoms
of speech, press, and political asso-

June of 1975, the full

ciation.

CONCLUSION

This essay has sought to trace the
influence of American judicial review abroad. Men and nations alike
have marveled at the American

experiment

in

democracy,

even as

Tocqueville did, and judicial review
has been

an important aspect of that
experiment. On the whole, and par-

ticularly in this century, it has served
the cause of liberty in the United
States. And those nations which

have

adopted judicial review have
also, for the most part, placed their
basic constitutional rights under the
protection of the judiciary. But, of
course, the liberties of a people
clearly do not depend upon judicial
review any more than democracy
does, for judicial review itself is an
extremely fragile institution. It has
proved workable and durable only
in stable constitutional democracies

which, like the United States, have
been willing to tolerate diversity and
a pluralism of interests while yet
seeking equal justice under law.

